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Abstract
We model learning in a continuous-time Brownian setting where
there is prior ambiguity. The associated model of preference values ro-
bustness and is time-consistent. It is applied to study optimal learning
when the choice between actions can be postponed, at a per-unit-time
cost, in order to observe a signal that provides information about an
unknown parameter. The corresponding optimal stopping problem
is solved in closed-form, with a focus on two specific settings: Ells-
berg’s two-urn thought experiment expanded to allow learning before
the choice of bets, and a robust version of the classical problem of se-
quential testing of two simple hypotheses about the unknown drift of
a Wiener process. In both cases, the link between robustness and the
demand for learning is studied.
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1 Introduction
We consider a decision-maker (DM) choosing between three actions whose
payoffs are uncertain because they depend on both exogenous randomness
and on an unknown parameter θ, θ = θ0 or θ1. She can postpone the choice
of action so as to learn about θ by observing the realization of a signal
modeled by a Brownian motion with drift. Because of a per-unit-time cost of
sampling, which can be material or cognitive, she faces an optimal stopping
problem. A key feature is that DM does not have sufficient information
to arrive at a single prior about θ, that is, there is ambiguity about θ.
Therefore, prior beliefs are represented by a nonsingleton set of probability
measures, and DM seeks to make robust choices of both stopping time and
action by solving a maxmin problem. In addition, she is forward-looking and
dynamically consistent as in the continuous-time version of maxmin utility
given by Chen and Epstein (2002). One contribution herein is to extend the
latter model to accommodate learning. As a result, we capture robustness
to ambiguity (or model uncertainty), learning and time-consistency. The
other contribution is to investigate optimal learning in the above setting,
with particular focus on two special cases that extend classical models. The
corresponding optimal stopping problems are solved explicitly and the effects
of ambiguity on optimal learning are determined.
The first specific context begins with Ellsberg’s metaphorical thought
experiment: There are two urns, each containing balls that are either red
or blue, where the ”known” or risky urn contains an equal number of red
and blue balls, while no information is provided about the proportion of red
balls in the ”unknown” or ambiguous urn. DM must choose between betting
on the color drawn from the risky urn or from the ambiguous urn. The
intuitive behavior highlighted by Ellsberg is the choice to bet on the draw
from the risky urn no matter the color, which behavior is paradoxical for
subjective expected utility theory, or indeed, for any model in which beliefs
are represented by a single probability measure. Ellsberg’s paradox is often
taken as a normative critique of the Bayesian model and of the view that the
single prior representation of beliefs is implied by rationality (e.g., Gilboa
2009, 2015; Gilboa et al. 2012). Here we add to the thought experiment
by including a possibility to learn. Specifically, we allow DM to postpone
her choice so that she can observe realizations of a diffusion process whose
drift is equal to the proportion of red in the ambiguous urn. Under specific
parametric restrictions we completely describe the optimal joint learning
and betting strategy. In particular, we show that it can be optimal to reject
learning completely, and, if some learning is optimal, then it is never opti-
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mal to bet on the risky urn after stopping. The rationality of no learning
suggests that one needs to reexamine and qualify the common presumption
that ambiguity would fade away, or at least diminish, in the presence of
learning opportunities (Marinacci 2002). It can also explain experimental
findings (Trautman and Zeckhauser 2013) that some subjects neglect op-
portunities to learn about an ambiguous urn even at no visible (material)
cost. In addition, our model is suggestive of laboratory experiments that
could provide further evidence on the connection between ambiguity and
the demand for learning.
The second application is to the classical problem of sequential testing
of two simple hypotheses about the unknown drift of a Wiener process. The
seminal papers, both using a discrete-time framework, are Wald (1945,1947),
which shows that the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) provides an
optimal trade-off between type I and type II errors, and Arrow, Blackwell
and Girshick (1949), which derives SPRT from utility maximization us-
ing dynamic programming arguments. More recently, Peskir and Shiryaev
(2006, Ch. 6) employ a Bayesian subjectivist approach and derive SPRT as
the solution to a continuous-time optimal stopping problem. We extend the
latter analysis to accommodate situations where DM, a statistician/analyst,
does not have sufficient information to justify reliance on a single prior. We
show that it is optimal to stop if every ”compatible” Bayesian (one whose
prior is an element of the set of priors used by the robustness-seeking DM)
would choose to do so. But the corresponding statement for ”continue”
is false: it may be optimal to stop under robustness even given a realized
sample at which all compatible Bayesians would choose to continue. In this
sense, ”sensitivity analysis” overstates the robustness value of sampling.
We view our model as normative, which perspective is most evident in
the hypothesis testing context. Time-consistency of preference has obvious
prescriptive appeal. It is important to understand that, roughly speaking,
time-consistency is the requirement that a contingent plan (e.g., a stopping
strategy) that is optimal ex ante remain optimal conditional on every sub-
sequent realization assuming there are no surprises or unforeseen events.
A possible argument against such consistency, (that is sometimes expressed
in the statistics literature), is that surprises are inevitable and thus that
any prescription should take that into account rather than excluding their
possibility. We would agree that a sophisticated decision-maker would ex-
pect that surprises may occur while (necessarily) being unable to describe
what form they could take. However, to the best of our knowledge there
currently does not exist a convincing model in the economics, statistics or
psychology literatures of how such an individual should (or would) behave,
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that is, how the awareness that she may be missing something in her per-
ception of the future should (or would) affect current behavior. That leaves
time-consistency as a sensible guiding principle with the understanding that
reoptimization can (and should) occur if there is a surprise.
A brief review of other relevant literature concludes this introduction.
The classical Bayesian model of sequential decision-making, including in
particular applications to inference and experimentation, are discussed in
Howard (1970) and the references therein. The maxmin model of ambiguity
averse preference is axiomatized in a static setting in Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), (which owes an intellectual debt to the Arrow and Hurwicz (1972)
model of decision-making under ignorance), and in a multi-period discrete-
time framework in Epstein and Schneider (2003) where time-consistency is
one of the key axioms. Optimal stopping problems have been studied in
the absence of time-consistency. It is well-known that modeling a concern
with ambiguity and robust decision-making leads to ”nonlinear” objective
functions, which, in a dynamic setting and in the absence of commitment,
can lead to time-inconsistency issues (Peskir 2017). A similar issue arises
also in a risk context where there is a known objective probability law, but
where preference does not conform to von Neumann-Morgenstern’s expected
utility theory (Ebert and Strack 2018; Huang et al. 2018). Such models are
problematic in normative contexts. It is not clear why one would ever pre-
scribe to a decision-maker (who is unable or unwilling to commit) that she
should adopt a criterion function that would imply time-inconsistent plans
and that she should then resolve these inconsistencies by behaving strate-
gically against her future selves (as is commonly assumed). The recursive
maxmin model has been used in macroeconomics and finance (e.g., Epstein
and Schneider 2010) and also in robust multistage stochastic optimization
(e.g., Shapiro (2016) and the references therein, including to the closely re-
lated literature on conditional risk measures). Shapiro focuses on a property
of sets of measures, called rectangularity following Epstein and Schneider
(2003), that underlies recursivity of utility and time-consistency. Most of
the existing literature deals with a discrete-time setting. The theoretical lit-
erature on learning under ambiguity is sparse and limited to passive learning
(e.g., Epstein and Schneider 2007, 2008). With regard to hypothesis test-
ing, this paper adds to the literature on robust Bayesian statistics (Berger
1984,1985,1994; Rios-Insua and Ruggeri 2000), which is largely restricted to
a static environment. Walley (1991) goes further and considers both a prior
and a single posterior stage, but not sequential hypothesis testing. For a
frequentist approach to robust sequential testing see Huber (1965).
Closest to the present paper is the literature on bandit problems with
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ambiguity and robustness (Caro and Das Gupta 2015; Li 2019). Both pa-
pers model endogenous learning (or experimentation) by maxmin dynami-
cally consistent agents. Their models differ from ours in that they assume
discrete time, an exogenously given horizon, and also in the nature of exper-
imentation. In our model, the once-and-for-all choice of action and resulting
payoff come after all learning has ceased, while in bandit problems, action
choice and flow payoffs are continuous and intertwined with learning (for
example, the cost of experimentation is the implied reduction in current
flow payoffs). Consequently, their analyses and characterizations are much
different, for example, their focus on the existence of a suitable Gittins index
has no counterpart in our model.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the model of
utility extending Chen-Epstein to accommodate learning. Readers who are
primarily interested in applications can skip this relatively technical section
and move directly to §3 where the ”applied” optimal stopping problems are
studied. The (more) general optimal stopping problem is solved in §4 (The-
orem 4.2), thereby providing a unifying perspective on the two applications
and some indication of the robustness of the results therein. Proofs are
contained in the e-companion to this paper.
2 Recursive utility with learning
For background regarding time-consistency in the maxmin framework, con-
sider first the following informal outline that anticipates the specific setting
of this paper. DM faces uncertainty about a payoff-relevant state space Ω
due to uncertainty about the value of a parameter θ ∈ Θ. Each θ deter-
mines a unique probability law on Ω, but there is prior ambiguity about
the parameter that is represented by a nonsingleton set M0 of priors on Θ.
As time proceeds, DM learns about the parameter through observation of
a signal whose increments are distributed i.i.d. conditional on θ. At issue
is how to model beliefs about Ω, that is, the set P0 of predictive priors.
(Throughout we adopt the common practice of distinguishing terminologi-
cally between beliefs about the state space, referred to as predictive priors,
and beliefs about parameters, which are referred to as priors.) A seemingly
natural approach is to take P0 to be the set of all measures that can be
obtained by combining some prior µ0 in M0 with the given conditionally
i.i.d. likelihood. Learning is modeled through the set of posteriors Mt at t
obtained via prior-by-prior Bayesian updating of M0, and a corresponding
set Pt of predictive posteriors is obtained as above. Finally, at each t ≥ 0, Pt
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guides choice according to the maxmin model. The point, however, is that
time-consistency is violated: in general, ex ante optimal plans do not remain
optimal according to updated beliefs. The reason is straightforward. Be-
havior at t is depends on the worst-case posterior µt inMt, but worst-cases
at different nodes need not belong to same prior µ0. This is in contrast with
the ex ante perspective expressed via P0 where a single worst-case prior µ0
determines the entire ex ante optimal plan. To restore dynamic consistency,
one can enlarge P0 by adding to it all measures obtained by pasting together
alien posteriors, leading to a ”rectangular” set that is closed with respect
to further pasting. One can think of the enlarged set as capturing both the
subjectively possible probability laws and backward induction reasoning by
DM.a
See Epstein and Schneider (2003) for further discussion and axiomatic
foundations in a discrete-time framework, and Chen and Epstein (2002)–CE
below–for a continuous-time formulation that we outline next. Then we de-
scribe how it can be adapted to include learning with partial information.
The latter description is given in the simplest context adequate for the ap-
plications below. However, it should be clear that it can be adapted more
generally.
Let (Ω,G∞, P0) be a probability space, andW = (Wt)0≤t<∞ a 1-dimensional
Brownian motion which generates the filtration G = {Gt}t≥0, with Gt ր G∞.
(All probability spaces are taken to be complete and all related filtrations
are augmented in the usual sense.) The measure P0 is a reference measure
whose role is only to define null events. CE define a set of predictive priors
P0 on (Ω,G∞) through specification of their densities with respect to P0. To
do so, they take as an additional primitive a (suitably adapted) set-valued
process (Ξt). (Technical restrictions are that Ξt : Ω  K ⊂ R
d for some
compact set K independent of t, 0 ∈ Ξt (ω) dt ⊗ dP0 a.s., and that each
Ξt is convex- and compact-valued.) Define the associated set of real-valued
processes by
Ξ = {η = (ηt) | ηt(ω) ∈ Ξt(ω) dt⊗ dP0 a.s.}.
Then each η ∈ Ξ defines a probability measure on G∞, denoted P
η, that is
equivalent to P0 on each Gt, and is given by
dP η
dP0
|Gt= exp{−
∫ t
0
η2sds−
∫ t
0
ηsdWs} for all t.
Accordingly, each ηt(ω) ∈ Ξt(ω) can be thought of roughly as defining con-
ditional beliefs about Gt+dt, and Ξt (ω) is called the set of density generators
6
at (t, ω). By the Girsanov Theorem,
dW ηt = ηtdt+ dWt (1)
is a Brownian motion under P η, which thus can be understood as an alter-
native hypothesis about the drift of the driving process W (the drift is 0
under P0). Finally,
P0 ≡ {P
η : η ∈ Ξ} . (2)
(The ”pasting” referred to above is accomplished through the fact that Ξ is
constructed by taking all selections from the Ξts.)
The set P0 is used to define a time 0 utility function on a suitable set
of random payoffs denominated in utils. In order to model in the sequel
the choice of how long to learn (or sample), we consider a set of stopping
times τ , that is, each τ is an adapted R+-valued and {Gt}-adapted random
variable defined on Ω, that is, {ω : τ (ω) > t} ∈ Gt for every t. For each such
τ , utility is defined on the set L(τ) of real-valued random variables given by
L(τ) = {ξ | ξ is Gτ -measurable and sup
Q∈P0
EQ | ξ |<∞}.
The time 0 utility of any ξ ∈ L(τ) is given by
U0 (ξ) = inf
Q∈P0
EQξ = − sup
Q∈P0
EQ[−ξ]. (3)
It is natural to consider also conditional utilities at each (t, ω), where
Ut (ξ) = ess inf
Q∈P0
EQ[ξ | Gt]. (4)
In words, Ut (ξ) is the utility of ξ at time t conditional on the information
available then and given the state ω (the dependence of Ut (ξ) on ω is sup-
pressed notationally). The special construction of P0 delivers the following
counterpart of the law of total probability (or law of iterated expectations):
For each ξ, and 0 ≤ t < t′,
Ut (ξ) = ess inf
Q∈P0
EQ [Ut′ (ξ) | Gt] . (5)
This recursivity ultimately delivers the time-consistency of optimal choices.
The components P0, W , (Ξt) and {Gt} are primitives in CE. Next we
specify them in terms of the deeper primitives of a model that includes
learning about an unknown parameter θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R.
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Specifically, begin with a measurable space (Ω,F), a filtration {Ft},
Ft ր F∞ ⊂ F , and a collection {P
µ : µ ∈ M0} of pairwise equivalent
probability measures on (Ω,F). Though θ is an unknown deterministic
parameter, for mathematical precision we view θ as a random variable on
(Ω,F). Further, for each µ ∈ M0, P
µ induces the distribution µ for θ
via µ(A) = Pµ({θ ∈ A}) for all Borel measurable A ⊂ Θ. Accordingly,
M0 can be viewed as a set of priors on Θ, and its nonsingleton nature
indicates ambiguity about θ. There is also a standard Brownian motion
B = (Bt), with generated filtration {F
B
t }, such that B is independent of
θ under each Pµ. B is the Brownian motion driving the signals process
Z = (Zt) according to
Zt =
∫ t
0
θds+
∫ t
0
σdBs = θt+ σBt, (6)
where σ is a known positive constant. Because only realizations of Zt are ob-
servable, take {Gt} to be the filtration generated by Z. Assuming knowledge
of the signal structure, Bayesian updating of µ ∈ M0 gives the posterior µt
at time t. Thus prior-by-prior Bayesian updating leads to the set-valued
process (Mt) of posteriors on θ.
Proceed to specify the other CE components P0, W and (Ξt).
Step 1. Take µ ∈ M0. By standard filtering theory (Liptser and Shiryaev
1977, Theorem 8.3), if we replace the unknown parameter θ by the estimate
θ̂µt =
∫
θdµt, then we can rewrite (6) in the form
dZt = θˆ
µ
t (Zt) dt+ σ(dBt +
θ − θˆµt (Zt)
σ
dt) (7)
= θˆµt (Zt) dt+ σdB˜
µ
t ,
where the innovation process (B˜µt ) is a standard {Gt}-adapted Brownian
motion on (Ω,G∞, P
µ). Thus (B˜µt ) takes the same role as (W
η
t ) in CE (see
(1) above). Rewrite (7) as
dB˜µt = −
1
σ
θˆµt (Zt) dt+
1
σ
dZt
which suggests that (Zt/σ) (resp. (−θˆ
µ
t (Zt) /σ)) can be chosen as the Brow-
nian motion (Wt) (resp. the drift (ηt)) in (1).
Step 2. Find a reference probability measure P0 on (Ω,G∞) under which
(Zt/σ) is a {Gt}-adapted Brownian motion on (Ω,G∞). Fix µ ∈ M0 and
8
define P0 by:
dP0
dPµ
|Gt = exp{−
1
2σ2
∫ t
0 (θˆ
µ
s (Zs))
2ds− 1σ
∫ t
0 θˆ
µ
s (Zs) dB˜
µ
s }
= exp{ 12σ2
∫ t
0 (θˆ
µ
s (Zs))
2ds− 1σ2
∫ t
0 θˆ
µ
s (Zs) dZs}.
By Girsanov’s Theorem, (Zt/σ) is a {Gt}-adapted Brownian motion under
P0.
Step 3. Viewing P0 as a reference measure, perturb it. For each µ ∈ M0,
define Pµ0 on (Ω,G∞) by
dPµ0
dP0
|Gt= exp{−
1
2σ2
∫ t
0
(θˆµs (Zs))
2ds+
1
σ2
∫ t
0
θˆµs (Zs) dZs}.
By Girsanov, dB˜µt = −
1
σ θˆ
µ
t (Zt) dt+
1
σdZt is a Brownian motion under P
µ
0 .
In general, Pµ 6= Pµ0 . However, they induce the identical distribution
for Z. This is because (B˜µt ) is a {Gt}-adapted Brownian motion under both
Pµ and Pµ0 . Therefore, by the uniqueness of weak solutions to SDEs, the
solution Zt of (7) on (Ω,F∞, P
µ) and the solution Z ′ of (7) on (Ω,G∞, P
µ
0 )
have identical distributions. (Argue as in Oksendal (2005, Example 8.6.9).
Given that only the distribution of signals matters in our model, there is no
reason to distinguish between the two probability measures. Thus we apply
CE to the following components: W and P0 defined in Step 2, and Ξt given
by
Ξt = {−θˆ
µ
t /σ : µ ∈ M0, θ̂
µ
t =
∫
θdµt}. (8)
In summary, taking these specifications for P0, W , (Ξt) and {Gt} in the
CE model yields a set P0 of predictive priors, and a corresponding utility
function, that capture prior ambiguity about the parameter θ (throughM0),
learning as signals are realized (through updating to the set of posteriors
Mt), and robust (maxmin) and time-consistent decision-making (because
of (5)). We use this model in the optimal stopping problems that follow.
The only remaining primitive isM0, which is specified to suit the particular
setting of interest.
As indicated, the key technical step in our extension of CE is in adopting
the weak formulation rather than their strong formulation. For readers
who may be unfamiliar with this distinction we suggest Oksendal (2005,
Section 5.3) for discussion of weak versus strong solutions of SDEs, and
Zhang (2017, Chapter 9). The latter exposits both the technical advantages
of the weak formulation and its economic rationale, notably in models with
imperfect information (such as here, where given (6), Z is observed but not
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B), or asymmetric information (such as in principal-agent models). In our
context, the weak formulation is suggested if one views B not as modeling a
physical noise or shock, but rather as a way to specify that the distribution
of (Zt − θt) /σ is standard normal (conditional on θ).
3 Optimal learning
3.1 The framework and general problem
DM must choose an action from the set A = {a0, a1, a2}. Payoffs are uncer-
tain and depend on an unknown parameter θ. Before choosing an action,
DM can learn about θ by observing realizations of the signal process Z given
by (6), where σ is a known positive constant. There is a constant per-unit-
time cost c > 0 of learning. (The underlying state space Ω, the filtration
{Gt} generated by Z, and other notation are as in §2. Unless specified other-
wise, all processes below are taken to be {Gt}-adapted even where not stated
explicitly.)
If DM stops learning at t, then her conditional expected payoff (in utils)
is Xt; think of Xt as the indirect utility she can attain by choosing optimally
from A. DM is forward-looking and has time 0 beliefs about future signals
given by the set P0 ⊂ ∆(Ω,G∞) described in the previous section. Her
choice of when to stop is described by a stopping time (or strategy) τ ,
which is restricted to be uniformly integrable (supQ∈P0 EQτ < ∞); the set
of all stopping strategies is Γ. As a maxmin agent she chooses an optimal
stopping strategy τ∗ by solving
max
τ∈Γ
min
P∈P0
EP (Xτ − cτ) . (9)
It remains to specify M0, which determines P0 as described in §2, and Xt.
We assume that all priors µ in M0 have binary support Θ = {θ0,θ1},
θ0 < θ1. Specifically, let
M0 = {µ
m = (1−m)δθ0 +mδθ1 : m0 ≤ m ≤ m0}. (10)
Therefore, M0 can be identified with the probability interval [m0,m0] for
the larger parameter value θ1. Let 0 < m0 < m0 < 1.
Bayesian updating of each prior yields the following set of posteriors at
t,
Mt = {(1 −m)δθ0 +mδθ1 : mt ≤ m ≤ mt}, (11)
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where, by Liptser and Shiryaev (1977, Theorem 9.1),
mt =
m0
1−m0
ϕ(t, Zt)
1 +
m0
1−m0
ϕ(t, Zt)
, mt =
m0
1−m0
ϕ(t, Zt)
1 + m01−m0ϕ(t, Zt)
, (12)
and
ϕ(t, z) = exp{
θ1 − θ0
σ2
z −
1
2σ2
(θ21 − θ
2
0)t}. (13)
Conditional on the parameter value, payoffs are given by u (ai, θj), where
each u (ai, θj) is nonnegative. Think of u (·, θj) as including the valuation
of any risk remaining even if θj is known to be true, for example, u (ai, θj)
could be the expected utility of the lottery implied by (ai, θj). Payoffs are
assumed to satisfy: for each i, j = 0, 1, i 6= j,
u (aj , θj) = u (ai, θi) > u (aj , θi) . (14)
Thus a0 is better than a1 given θ0, and the reverse given θ1, and the payoff
to the better action is the same for both parameter values. The payoff to the
third action a2 does not depend on θ, and can be thought of as a default or
outside option. Its payoff is not ambiguous because incomplete confidence
about θ is the only source of ambiguity in the model, but choice of a2 may
entail risk. Adopt the notation
u2 = u (a2, θ0) = u (a2, θ1) . (15)
It is evident that action a2 may be irrelevant if its payoff is sufficiently low,
for example, if u2 = 0. To exclude the trivial case where a2 is always chosen,
assume that
u2 < u (ai, θi) , i = 0, 1.
Consider next payoffs conditional on time t beliefs about θ as repre-
sented by the set of posteriors Mt. The Gilboa-Schmeidler utility of ai is
minµ∈Mt
∫
u (ai, θ) dµ. Therefore, if DM chooses an optimal action at time
t, then her payoff is
Xt = max
{
min
µ∈Mt
∫
u (a0, θ) dµ, min
µ∈Mt
∫
u (a1, θ) dµ, u2
}
. (16)
The preceding completes specification of the optimal stopping problem
(9). Its solution is described in §4 under two alternative additional assump-
tions:
Payoff symmetry u (a0, θ1) = u (a1, θ0)
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No risky option u2 ≤ u (ai, θj), i 6= j = 0, 1
The first assumption adds to the symmetry contained in (14). Given (14),
the second implies that action a2 is (weakly) inferior to each of a0 and a1
conditional on either parameter value. Hence, it would never be chosen
uniquely and can be ignored, leaving only two actions. These assumptions
are satisfied respectively by the two special models upon which we focus:
Ellsberg’s urns (payoff symmetry) and hypothesis testing (no risky option).
We focus on these first because they extend classic models in the litera-
ture and because they provide simply distinct insights into the connection
between ambiguity and optimal learning.
3.2 Learning and Ellsberg’s urns
There are two urns each containing balls that are either red or blue: a risky
urn in which the proportion of red balls is 12 and an ambiguous urn in which
the color composition is unknown. Denote by θ+ 12 the unknown proportion
of red balls. Thus θ denotes the bias towards red: θ > 0 indicates more red
than blue, θ < 0 indicates the opposite, and θ = 0 indicates an equal number
as in the risky urn. DM can choose between betting on the draw from the
risky or ambiguous urn and also on drawing red or blue. In the absence of
learning, the intuitive behavior highlighted by Ellsberg is to bet on the draw
from the risky urn no matter the color. Here we consider betting preference
when an ambiguity averse decision-maker can defer the choice between bets
until after learning optimally about θ.
To do so, we apply the model described above with particular specifica-
tions for its key primitives A, Θ, M0 and u. For A, let a2 denote a bet on
the risky urn and let a1 (a0) denote the bet on drawing red (blue) from the
ambiguous urn. (Note that there is no need to differentiate between bets on
red and blue for the risky urn.) Take Θ = {θ0, θ1}, where θ0 + θ1 = 0, or
equivalently, for some 0 < α < 12 ,
θ0 = −α, θ1 = α. (17)
Thus only two possible biases, of equal size, are thought possible, (the pro-
portion of red is either 12 − α or
1
2 + α). However, there is ambiguity about
which direction for the bias is more likely. This ambiguity is modeled by
M0 having the form in (10), where we assume in addition that the prob-
ability interval for α (the bias towards red) is such that m0 +m0 = 1, or
equivalently, for some 0 < ǫ < 1,
m0 =
1− ǫ
2
, m0 =
1 + ǫ
2
. (18)
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Thus the lowest probability for a bias towards blue equals that for red, im-
plying indifference at time 0 between bets on red and blue. This assumption,
and also the color symmetry in (17), are natural since information about the
ambiguous urn gives no reason to distinguish between colors.
We are left with the two parameters α and ǫ. We interpret ǫ as modeling
ambiguity (aversion): the probability interval
[
1−ǫ
2 ,
1+ǫ
2
]
for the bias towards
red is larger if ǫ increases. At the extreme when ǫ = 0, then M0 is the
singleton according to which the two biases are equally likely, and DM is a
Bayesian who faces uncertainty with variance α2 about the true bias, but no
ambiguity. We interpret α as measuring the degree of this prior uncertainty,
or prior variance; (α = 0 implies certainty that the composition of the
ambiguous urn is identical to that of the risky urn).
Finally, specify payoffs u. All bets have the same winning and losing
prizes, denominated in utils, which can be normalized to 1 and 0 respectively.
Given the composition of the ambiguous urn, then only risk is involved in
every bet, and an expected utility calculation yields
u (a0,−α) = u (a1, α) = α+
1
2 , u (a0, α) = u (a1,−α) = α−
1
2 , and u2 =
1
2 .
(19)
The assumptions in §3.1 are readily verified.
For convenience of the reader, we include the implied expression for the
conditional payoff Xt = X(Zt):
X(Zt) =

(12 + α)−
2α
1+ 1−ǫ
1+ǫ
ϕ(Zt)
if Zt >
σ2
2α log(
1+ǫ
1−ǫ)
(12 − α) +
2α
1+ 1+ǫ
1−ǫ
ϕ(Zt)
if Zt < −
σ2
2α log(
1+ǫ
1−ǫ)
1
2 otherwise,
(20)
where ϕ(z) = exp
(
2αz/σ2
)
. Thus if Zt is large positive (negative), then a
bet on drawing red (blue) from the ambiguous urn is optimal. For inter-
mediate values, there is not enough evidence for a bias in either direction
to compensate for the ambiguity and betting on the risky urn is optimal.
This is true in particular ex ante where Z0 = 0, consistent with the intuitive
ambiguity-averse behavior in Ellsberg’s 2-urn experiment without learning.
We give an explicit solution to the optimal stopping problem (9) satis-
fying (17)-(19). To do so, let
l(r) = 2 log(
r
1− r
)−
1
r
+
1
1− r
, r ∈ (0, 1), (21)
and define r̂ by
l(r̂) =
2α3
cσ2
. (22)
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r̂ is uniquely defined thereby and 12 < r̂ < 1, because l(·) is strictly increas-
ing, l(0) = −∞, l(12) = 0, and l(1) =∞.
Theorem 3.1 (i) τ∗ = 0 if and only if 1+ǫ2 ≥ r̂, in which case Xτ∗ = X0 =
1
2 .
(ii) Let 1+ǫ2 < r̂. Then the optimal stopping time satisfies τ
∗ > 0 and is
given by
τ∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : | Zt |≥ z},
where
z =
σ2
2α
[
log
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
+ log
r
1− r
]
> 0, (23)
and r, r̂ < r < 1, is the unique solution to the equation
l(r) + l(
1 + ǫ
2
) =
4α3
cσ2
. (24)
Moreover, on stopping either the bet on red is chosen (if Zτ∗ ≥ z) or the bet
on blue is chosen (if Zτ∗ ≤ −z); the bet on the risky urn is never optimal at
τ∗ > 0. Finally, if ǫ < ǫ′ < 2r̂ − 1, and if τ∗′ is the corresponding optimal
stopping time, then τ∗′ ≥ τ∗.
The two cases are defined by the relative magnitudes of ǫ, parametrizing
ambiguity, and r̂, which is an increasing function of α3/
(
cσ2
)
; in particular,
through α, it depends positively on the payoff to knowing the direction of
the true bias. Thus (i) considers the case where ambiguity is large realtive
to payoffs (and taking also sampling cost and signal variance into account).
Then no learning is optimal and the bet on the risky urn is chosen immedi-
ately. In contrast, some learning is necessarily optimal given small ambiguity
(case (ii)), including in the limiting Bayesian model with ǫ = 0. Thus it is
optimal to reject learning if and only if ambiguity, as measured by ǫ, is suit-
ably large. In case (ii), it is optimal to sample as long as the signal Zt lies in
the continuation interval (−z, z). Two features of this learning region stand
out. First, when Zt hits either endpoint, learning stops and DM bets on
the ambiguous urn. Thus the risky urn is chosen (if and) only if it is not
optimal to learn. The second noteworthy feature is that sampling increases
with greater ambiguity as measured by ǫ, though when ǫ reaches 2r̂−1, then,
by (i), it is optimal to reject any learning.
There is simple intuition for the preceding. First, consider the effect of
ambiguity (large ǫ) on the incentive to learn. DM’s prior beliefs admit only
α and −α as the two possible values for the true bias. She will incur the
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cost of learning if she believes that she is likely to learn quickly which of
these is true. She understands that she will come to accept α (or −α) as
being true given realization of sufficiently large positive (negative) values for
Zt. A difficulty is that she is not sure which probability law in her set P0
describes the signal process. As a conservative decision-maker, she bases her
decisions on the worst-case scenario P ∗ in her set. Because she is trying to
learn, the worst-case minimizes the probability of extreme, hence revealing,
signal realizations, which, informally speaking, occurs if P ∗({dZt > 0} |
Zt > 0) and P
∗({dZt < 0} | Zt < 0) are as small as possible. That is,
if Zt > 0, then the distribution of the increment dZt is computed using
the posterior associated with that prior in M0 which assigns the largest
probability 1+ǫ2 to the negative bias−α, while if Zt < 0, then the distribution
of the increment is computed using the posterior associated with the prior
assigning the largest probability 1+ǫ2 to the positive bias α. It follows that,
from the perspective of the worst-case scenario, the signal structure is less
informative the greater is ǫ. Accordingly, conditional on some learning being
optimal, then it must be with the expectation of a long sampling period that
increases in length with ǫ. A second effect of an increase in ǫ is that it reduces
the ex ante utility of betting on the ambiguous urn and hence implies that
signals in an increasingly large interval would not change betting preference.
Consequently, a small sample is unlikely to be of value – only long samples
are useful. Together, these two effects suggest existence of a cutoff value for
ǫ beyond which no amount of learning is sufficiently attractive to justify its
cost. At the cutoff, here 2r̂−1, DM is just indifferent between stopping and
learning for another instant.
There remains the following question for smaller values of ǫ: why is it
never optimal to try learning for a while and then, for some sample re-
alizations, to stop and bet on the risky urn? The intuition, adapted from
Fudenberg, Strack and Strzalecki (2018), is that this feature is a consequence
of the specification M0 for the set of priors. To see why, suppose that Zt
is small for some positive t. A possible interpretation, particularly for large
t, is that the true bias is small and thus that there is little to be gained by
continuing to sample – DM might as well stop and bet on the risky urn.
But this reasoning is excluded when, as in our specification, DM is certain
that the bias is ±α. Then signals sufficiently near 0 must be noise and the
situation is essentially the same as it was at the start. Hence, if stopping
to bet on the risky urn were optimal at t, it would have been optimal also
at time 0. This intuition is suggestive of the likely consequences of general-
izing the specification of M0. Suppose, for example, that M0 is such that
all its priors share a common finite support. We conjecture that then the
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predicted incompatibility of learning and betting on the risky urn would be
overturned if the zero bias point is in the common support.
Finally, using the closed-form solution in the theorem, we can give more
concrete expression to the effect of ambiguity on optimal learning. Restrict
attention to values of ǫ in [0, 2r̂ − 1), where some learning is optimal, and
denote by P θ the probability distribution of (Zt) if θ is the true bias. Then,
by well-known results regarding hitting times of Brownian motion with drift
(Borodin and Salminen 2015), the mean sample length according to P θ is
Eθτ∗ =
 (z/σ)2
[
tanh(θz/σ2)
θz/σ2
]
if θ 6= 0
(z/σ)2 if θ = 0,
(25)
which is increasing in ǫ. Note also that θZτ∗ > 0 if and only if the bet on
red (blue) is chosen on stopping if θ > 0 (θ < 0). Thus the probability, if
θ 6= 0 is the true bias, of choosing the ”correct” bet on stopping is given by
P θ ({θZτ∗ > 0}) =
1
1 + exp
(
−2|θ|
σ2
z
) , if θ 6= 0,
which increases with ǫ. (To prove this equality, apply the optional stopping
theorem to the P θ-martingale e−2θZt/σ
2
.)
The proof of Theorem 3.1 yields a closed-form expression for the value
function associated with the optimal stopping problem. In particular, the
value at time 0 satisfies (from (44) and (50)),
v0 −
1
2 =
{
0 if 1+ǫ2 ≥ r̂
cσ2
4α2 [
1
r(1−r) −
4
(1+ǫ)(1−ǫ) ] if
1+ǫ
2 < r̂.
(26)
Since the payoff 12 is the best available without learning, v0 −
1
2 is the value
of the learning option. It is positive for small ǫ < 2r̂ − 1 and declines
continuously to 0 as ǫ increases to the switch point. (Note that 1+ǫ2 = r̂
implies both are equal in turn to r, and hence that v0 is continuous at
ǫ = 2r̂ − 1.) This is consistent with intuition given above.
As a numerical example, let (c, σ, α) =
(
.01, 1, 18
)
, which gives .0488 as
the cutoff for ǫ. Thus learning is rejected if ǫ = .05. For ǫ = .04, however,
τ∗ > 0 and Eτ∗ = .61 under P θ=0. Neither of the values for ǫ is extreme:
in the classic Ellsberg setting (with no learning), they imply probability
equivalents for the bet on red equal to .4875 and .4900 for ǫ = .05 and
ǫ = .04 respectively.
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3.3 A robust sequential hypothesis test
DM samples the signal process Z with the objective of then choosing between
the two statistical hypotheses
H0 : θ = 0 and H1 : θ = β,
where β > 0. The novelty relative to Arrow, Blackwell and Girschik (1949)
and Peskir and Shiryaev (2006) is that there is prior ambiguity about the
value of θ and a robust decision procedure is sought.
The following specialization of the general model is adopted. Let Θ =
{0, β}. The actions a0 and a1 are accept H0 and accept H1, respectively.
A third action is absent because there is no ”outside option” - one of the
hypotheses must be chosen. (Formally, one could include a2 and specify its
payoff below to be zero, in which case it would never be chosen.) The set
of priors M0 is as given in (10), corresponding to the probability interval
[m0,m0] for θ = β. Finally, payoffs are given by
u (a0, 0) = u (a1, β) = a+ b,
u (a0, β) = b, u (a1, 0) = a,
where a, b > 0. (Payoffs in this context are usually specified in terms of
a loss function that is to be minimized. The loss function L satisfying
L (a0, 0) = L (a1, β) = 0, L (a0, β) = a, and L (a1, 0) = b, gives an equivalent
reformulation.)
There are two differences in specification from the Ellsberg context.
First, there is no counterpart of the risky urn when choosing between hy-
potheses. Second, while symmetry between colors is natural in the Ellsberg
context, symmetry between hypotheses is not; thus, b need not equal a and
the probability interval [m0,m0] need not be symmetric about
1
2 .
The optimal stopping problem (9) admits a closed-form solution. For
perspective, consider first the special Bayesian case (M0 = {µ}, henceMt =
{µt}, µt (β) = mt). Denote by r˜
ℓ
B < r˜
R
B the solutions to (33), which in this
context simplifies to
l(r˜RB)− l(r˜
l
B) =
a+b
cˆ
1
r˜R
B(1−r˜
R
B)
− 1
r˜l
B(1−r˜
l
B)
= b−acˆ .
(27)
Then we have the following classical result.
Theorem 3.2 (Peskir and Shiryaev 2006) In the Bayesian case, for any
prior probability m0 it is optimal to continue at t if and only if
r˜ℓB < mt < r˜
R
B . (28)
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Otherwise, it is optimal to accept H1 or H0 according as mt ≥ r˜
R
B or mt ≤ r˜
ℓ
B
respectively.
In the model with ambiguity, the cut-off values are r˜ℓ and r˜R, r˜ℓ <
r˜R, that solve the appropriate version of (33), and we have the following
generalization of the classical result.
Theorem 3.3 In the model with ambiguity, it is optimal to stop and accept
H1 or H0 according as mt ≥ r˜
R or mt ≤ r˜
ℓ respectively. Otherwise, it is
optimal to continue.
In addition, if a = b, then
r˜ℓB < r˜
ℓ and r˜R < r˜RB. (29)
Under the assumption of payoff symmetry (a = b), the theorem has note-
worthy implications for the relation between the optimal stopping strategies
for the Bayesian and the robustness-seeking DM. (We conjecture that (29)
is valid even if a 6= b, but a proof has escaped us.) If m0 ∈ [m0,m0] refer to
a compatible Bayesian. The theorem implies:
1. If every compatible Bayesian stops and chooses ai, then it is optimal
also for DM to stop and choose ai, i = 1, 2.
2. If every compatible Bayesian continues, then it may still be optimal
for DM to stop.
In other words, DM should accept a unanimous recommendation of com-
patible Bayesian experts if it is to stop and choose a specific action, but not
necessarily if it is to continue. In this sense, ”sensitivity analysis” overstates
the robustness value of sampling.
The intuition is clear. Prior ambiguity leads to the signal structure being
perceived as less likely to be informative (seen from the perspective of the
worst-case measure P ∗ - see the outline at the start of the proof of Theorem
4.2), even though the signal structure itself is not ambiguous. In contrast,
there is no counterpart given multiple Bayesian agents - each is confident in
beliefs about θ and is certain that signal increments are conditionally i.i.d.
Only DM internalizes uncertainty about the probability law and discounts
the benefits of learning accordingly.
Remark 3.4 As is made clear in Theorem 4.2, stopping conditions can be
stated equivalently in terms of either the signal process (as in the Ellsberg
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model), or posteriors (as here). In the text, we have adopted the formulations
that seem more natural for each particular setting. For example, the use of
posteriors above facilitates comparison with the classical Bayesian result.
Remark 3.5 Time-consistency in the present context is closely related to
the Stopping Rule Principle – that the stopping rule should have no effect
on what is inferred from observed data and hence on the decision taken after
stopping (Berger 1985). It is well-known that: (i) conventional frequen-
tist methods, based on ex ante fixed sample size significance levels, violate
this Principle and permit the analyst to sample to a foregone conclusion
when data-dependent stopping rules are permitted; and (ii) Bayesian poste-
rior odds analysis satisfies the Principle. Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld
(1996) point to the law of iterated expectations as responsible for excluding
foregone conclusions (if the prior is countably additive). Equation (5) is
a nonlinear counterpart that we suspect plays a similar role in our model
(though details are beyond the scope of this paper).
4 A more general theorem
In order to condense notation, we write uij in place of u (ai, θj), i, j = 0, 1.
Theorem 4.2 below describes the solution to the optimal stopping prob-
lem in §3.1 assuming either payoff symmetry (u01 = u10) or no risky option
(u2 ≤ min{u10, u01}). Payoff symmetry is satisfied in Theorem 3.1, but
the latter assumes more, specifically ex ante indifference between a0 and
a1 (m0 + m0 = 1) and u2 =
1
2(u00 + u10). Thus it is extended below by
Theorem 4.2(a). The assumption of no risky option is the crucial element
in the hypothesis testing example, and the corresponding optimal stopping
problem is isomorphic to that in part (b) of Theorem 4.2.
Both mt and mt defined in (12) are increasing functions of ϕ(t, zt). It
follows that there exists a unique pair of probabilities π and π and a unique
(deterministic) signal realization trajectory (z˜t) satisfying, for every t,
π = mt(z˜t), π = mt(z˜t), and
πu11 + (1− π) u10 = πu01 + (1− π)u00.
For example, z˜0 = 0, π = m0 and π = m0 if and only if a0 and a1 are
indifferent ex ante. More generally, a0 and a1 are indifferent conditional on
the signal z˜t at t and a0 (a1) is preferred at t if Zt < (>) z˜t.
Normalize the cost of learning to ĉ, cˆ = 2cσ2/(θ1 − θ0)
2.
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Optimal stopping strategies will be described in terms of several critical
values, that are, in turn, defined using the functions l and l˜: For all r in
(0, 1),
l(r) = 2 log(
r
1− r
)−
1
r
+
1
1− r
l˜(r) = log(
r
1− r
) +
r
1− r
.
Let (rR1 , r
R
2 ), (r
l
1, r
l
2),
(
rR, rl
)
and
(
r˜R, r˜l
)
solve the following equations
respectively:
l(rR2 )− l(r
R
1 ) =
u11−u10
cˆ
l˜(rR2 )− l˜(r
R
1 ) =
u2−u10
cˆ ,
(30)
l(rl2)− l(r
l
1) = −
u00−u01
cˆ
l˜(rl2)− l˜(r
l
1) =
u2−u00
cˆ ,
(31)
l(rR)− l(π) = u11−u10cˆ
l(rl)− l(π) = −u00−u01cˆ ,
(32)
l(r˜R)− l(π) = l(r˜l)− l(π) + u11−u10+u00−u01cˆ
l˜(r˜R)− l˜(π)− π
(
l(r˜R)− l(π)
)
=
l˜(r˜l)− l˜(π)− π
(
l(r˜l)− l(π)
)
.
(33)
(The latter reduces to (32) if payoff symmetry is satisfied.)
Define
u∗∗2 =
cˆ
2
[
1
rl(1− rl)
−
1
π(1− π)
] +
u00 − u01
2
. (34)
Besides the existence and uniqueness assertions, the next lemma proves
a number of properties that are important for the optimal stopping theorem
to follow.
Lemma 4.1 There exist unique solutions to (32) and (33), and the solu-
tions to the latter satisfy
r˜l < π, r˜R > π. (35)
If u2 ≥ u
∗∗
2 , then there exist unique solutions also to (30) and (31), and the
solutions satisfy
rl2 < r
l
1, r
R
1 < r
R
2 , π < r
R, rl < π.
If payoff symmetry is also satisfied, then:
π + π = 1 = rl + rR, and (36)
rl1 ≤ π ⇐⇒ r
R
1 ≥ π ⇐⇒ u2 ≥ u
∗∗
2 . (37)
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Define
f(t, r) =
θ1 + θ0
2
t+
σ2
θ1 − θ0
log(
1−m0
m0
r
1− r
)
f(t, r) =
θ1 + θ0
2
t+
σ2
θ1 − θ0
log(
1−m0
m0
r
1− r
).
Then mt
(
f(t, r)
)
= r = mt
(
f(t, r)
)
, and, for any r1 and r2,
f(t, r1) ≤ z˜t ⇐⇒ r1 ≤ π (38)
f(t, r2) ≥ z˜t ⇐⇒ r2 ≥ π.
Finally, define three stopping times:
τ0 ≡ min{t ≥ 0 : Zt ≤ f(t, r
l
2)}
= min{t ≥ 0 : mt ≤ r
l
2},
τ1 ≡ min{t ≥ 0 : Zt ≥ f(t, r
R
2 )}
= min{t ≥ 0 : mt ≥ r
R
2 }, and
τ2 ≡ min{t ≥ 0 : f(t, r
l
1) ≤ Zt ≤ f(t, r
R
1 )}
= min{t ≥ 0 : mt ≥ r
l
1 and mt ≤ r
R
1 }.
Theorem 4.2 (a) Assume payoff symmetry (u01 = u10).
(a.i) If rl1 ≤ π, then the optimal stopping time τ
∗ is given by
τ∗ = min{τi : i = 0, 1, 2}.
Moreover, if τ∗ = τi, then ai is optimal on stopping. In particular, if there
is ex ante indifference between a0 and a1 (π = m0 and π = m0), then τ
∗ = 0
and a2 is chosen.
(a.ii) If rl1 > π, then
τ∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : Zt ≤ f(t, r
l) or Zt ≥ f(t, r
R)}
= min{t ≥ 0 : mt ≤ r
l or mt ≥ r
R}.
Moreover, a0 is optimal on stopping if Zτ∗ ≤ f(τ
∗, rl) (equivalently if mτ∗ ≤
rl), a1 is optimal if Zτ∗ ≥ f(τ
∗, rR) (equivalently if mτ∗ ≥ r
R), and a2 is
never optimal.
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(b) Assume u2 ≤ min{u10, u01}. Then
τ∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : Zt ≤ f(t, r˜
l) or Zt ≥ f(t, r˜
R)}
= min{t ≥ 0 : mt ≤ r˜
l or mt ≥ r˜
R}.
Moreover, a0 is optimal on stopping if Zτ∗ ≤ f(τ
∗, r˜l) (equivalently if mτ∗ ≤
r˜l), a1 is optimal if Zτ∗ ≥ f(τ
∗, r˜R) (equivalently if mτ∗ ≥ r˜
R), and a2 is
never optimal.
In (a), the distinction between the two subcases depends on the relative
magnitudes of rl1 and π. From (31) it follows that r
l
1 falls as u2 increases,
while π does not depend on u2. Therefore, (a.i) applies if the payoff u2 to
the unambiguous default is sufficiently large. The other factor leading to
(a.i) is large π, equivalently (by (36)) small π, which is supported by m0
large and m0 small. Thus, (a.i) is supported also by large prior ambiguity.
In (a.i), τ∗ = 0 if either m0 ≤ r
l
2 (prior beliefs are strongly biased
towards θ0 and hence a0 is chosen immediately), orm0 ≥ r
R
2 (prior beliefs are
strongly biased towards θ1 and hence a1 is chosen), or m0 ≥ r
l
1 and m0 ≤ r
R
1
(the worst-case probabilities of both θ0 and θ1 are both sufficiently low that
neither a0 nor a1 are attractive enough to justify the cost of sampling and
hence a2 is chosen). That leaves continuation being optimal at time 0 if and
only if prior beliefs are ”intermediate” in the sense that
either: [rl2 < m0 < r
l
1] and m0 < r
R
2 ,
or: [rR1 < m0 < r
R
2 ] and m0 > r
l
2].
This continuation region could be empty. Since learning is only about the
payoffs to a0 and a1, the situation at time 0 that is least favorable to learning
is where there is ex ante indifference between a0 and a1 – then a long and
hence costly sample would likely be needed to modify the ex ante ranking of
actions. In this case, therefore, it is optimal to reject learning and choose a2,
as in Theorem 3.1. However, if, for example, a1 is strictly preferred initially,
then an incentive to learn is that a relatively short interval of sampling may
be enough to decide between a1 and a2. In addition, if m0 is sufficiently
large, say near 1, then near certainty that θ = θ1 can lead to rejection of
learning and the immediate choice of a1, rather than of a2 as in the Ellsberg
context.
In (a.ii), τ∗ = 0 iff [m0,m0] is disjoint from (r
ℓ, rR). Notably, the default
action is not chosen regardless of when sampling stops. Its payoff u2 is too
low (from (37), u2 < u
∗∗
2 ) compared to the expected payoff of choosing a0 or
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a1, possibly after some learning. Moreover, even given some learning, it is
not optimal to choose a2 regardless of the realized sample, as explained in
discussion of Theorem 3.1. Under ex ante indifference, Lemma 4.1 implies
that τ∗ > 0 in (a.ii). Combined with (a.i), we see that if there is ex ante
indifference between a0 and a1, then a2 is chosen if and only if there is no
learning, thus generalizing the result in the Ellsberg model. (The latter also
assumes u2 =
1
2(u00+u10), which we see here is not needed for the preceding
conclusion.)
Finally, consider (b), where the payoff to the unambiguous action is so
low that it would never be chosen, regardless of prior beliefs and even in
the absence of the option to learn. The optimal strategy is similar to that
in (a.ii) in form and interpretation - only the critical values may differ to
reflect the different assumptions about payoffs. Another comment about
(b) is that when m0 = m0, then π = π and the equations (33) defining the
critical values r˜R and r˜l become
l(r˜R)− l(r˜l) = u11−u10+u00−u01cˆ
l˜(r˜R)− l˜(r˜l) = u00−u10cˆ ,
which are equations (21.1.14) and (21.1.15) in Peskir and Shiryaev (2006).
Proof of the theorem is provided in the e-companion. Here we comment
briefly on the proof strategy.
The strategy is to: (i) guess the P ∗ in P0 that is the worst-case scenario;
(ii) solve the classical optimal stopping problem given the single prior P ∗;
(iii) show that the value function derived in (2) is also the value function for
our problem (9); and (4) use the value function to derive τ∗.
The intuition for the conjectured P ∗ was given in §3.2 for the Ellsberg
context. In this more general context, it extends to the conjecture that P ∗
should make P ∗({dZt > 0} | Zt > z˜t) and P
∗({dZt < 0} | Zt < z˜t) as
small as possible, by using mt when Zt > z˜t and mt when Zt < z˜t. (See
(41) for the precise definition of P ∗.) The search for the value function v
begins with the HJB equation which yields its functional form up to some
constants to be determined by smooth contact conditions between v and the
payoff function X (see Peskir and Shiryaev (2006) for this free-boundary ap-
proach to analysing optimal stopping problems). A new ingredient relative
to existing models stems from the nature of P ∗, specifically from the fact
that the relevant posterior probability at t switches between mt and mt as
described, implying that the form of the value function differs between the
regions Zt > z˜t and Zt < z˜t. Thus, in addition to ensuring a smooth contact
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at stopping points, one must also be concerned with the smooth connection
at z˜t.
We elaborate on the latter point in order to highlight the technical nov-
elty that arises from ambiguity. For concreteness consider (a.ii), where a2
is never chosen. Let y denote a posterior probability, computed using m0
or m0, depending on the sub-domain, and let V
R(y) : [π, 1] → [0,+∞) and
V l(y) : [0, π] → [0,+∞) denote corresponding candidates for the value in
the indicated regions. Then the variational inequality and smooth contacts
lead to the following free-boundary differential equation, in which rR ∈ (π, 1]
and rl ∈ [0, π) are also unknowns to be determined:
V Ryy(y) = cˆ
1
y2(1−y)2
, y ∈ (π, rR)
V R(rR) = (u11 − u10)r
R + u10
V Ry (r
R) = (u11 − u10)
V lyy(y) = cˆ
1
y2(1−y)2 , y ∈ (r
l, π)
V l(rl) = −(u00 − u01)r
l + u00
V ly (r
l) = −(u00 − u01),
(39)
and the (new) smooth contact conditions due to ambiguity (π < π):{
V R(π) = V l(π),
V Ry (π) = V
l
y (π).
(40)
In (a.ii), payoff symmetry leads to the simplification V Ry (π) = V
l
y (π) = 0,
which leads to (32) becoming two separated equations. However, in (b), the
connection is not trivial.
5 Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Below ”almost surely” qualifications should be understood, even where not
stated explicitly, and as defined relative to any measure in P0.
To compute the payoff Xt defined in (16), note that
min
µ∈Mt
∫
u (a0, θ) dµ = (u00 − u01)(1−mt) + u01,
min
µ∈Mt
∫
u (a1, θ) dµ = (u11 − u10)mt + u10.
There is a critical level of u2, denoted u
∗
2,
u∗2 =
u11u00 − u10u01
u00 + u11 − u01 − u10
.
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If u2 ≤ u
∗
2, then Xt ={
(u00 − u01)(1 −mt) + u01 if mt < π
(u11 − u10)mt + u10 if mt ≥ π.
Accordingly, the default action a2 is not optimal at any t, and a0 (a1) is
optimal conditional on stopping at t if mt < π (mt ≥ π). If u2 > u
∗
2, then
Xt = 
(u00 − u01)(1 −mt) + u01 if mt <
u00−u2
u00−u01
(u11 − u10)mt + u10 if mt ≥
u2−u10
u11−u10
u2 otherwise,
reflecting the conditional optimality of a0, a1 and a2 respectively in the three
indicated regions.
As in §2, for any µ ∈ M0, µt denotes its Bayesian posterior at t and
θ̂µt =
∫
θdµt is the corresponding posterior estimate of θ. The two extreme
measures µ = µ, µ, are defined by
µt (θ1) = mt and µt (θ1) = mt,
and yield the estimates θˆµt and θˆ
µ
t respectively. Let P
∗ be the probability
measure in P0 which has density generator process (ηt),
− ηt = (θˆ
µ
t /σ)1Zt≤z˜t + (θˆ
µ
t /σ)1Zt>z˜t . (41)
It will be shown that P ∗ is the worst-case scenario in P0.
Proof of (a.ii): Consider the classical optimal stopping problem under P ∗,
max
τ
EP ∗ [Xτ − cτ ]. (42)
Define g1 and g2 by, for 0 < y < 1, i = 1, 2,
gi(y;C2i−1, C2i) = cˆ(2y − 1) log(
y
1− y
) + C2i−1y + C2i, (43)
where the constants Ci (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are determined by smooth-contact
conditions.
We conjecture that the value function for (42) has the form: v(t, z) =
(u00 − u01)(1 −mt (z)) + u01 if z < f(t, r
l)
g1(mt (z) ;C1, C2) if f(t, r
l) ≤ z < z˜t
g2(mt (z) ;C3, C4) if z˜t ≤ z < f(t, r
R)
(u11 − u10)mt (z) + u10 if f(t, r
R) ≤ z,
(44)
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where
C1 = −cˆℓ(π), C3 = −cˆℓ(π)
C2 = (u00 − u01)(1− r
l) + u01
− cˆ[(2rl − 1) log(
rl
1− rl
)− ℓ(π)rl]
C4 = (u11 − u10)r
R + u10
− cˆ[(2rR − 1) log(
rR
1− rR
)− ℓ(π)rR].
(Note that the cut-off value u∗∗2 defined in (34) satisfies u
∗∗
2 = g1(π;C1, C2) =
g2(π;C3, C4) = v(t, z˜t).)
Lemma 5.1 v is the value function of the classical optimal stopping problem
(42), i.e., for any t ≥ 0,
v(t, z) = max
τ≥t
EP ∗ [Xτ−t − c(τ − t) | Zt = z].
Further, v satisfies the HJB equation
max{X(t, z)− v(t, z),−c+ vt(t, z) +
1
2
σ2vzz(z) + f(t, z)vz(t, z)} = 0, (45)
where f(t, z) ≡
[θ1 −
θ1 − θ0
1 + m01−m0ϕ(t, z)
]1{z<z˜t} + [θ1 −
θ1 − θ0
1 +
m0
1−m0
ϕ(t, z)
]1{z≥z˜t}. (46)
Finally, v also satisfies, ∀z ∈ (f(t, rl), f(t, rR)),
− c+ v(t, z) +
1
2
σ2vzz(z) + f(t, z)vz(t, z) = 0. (47)
For the proof, first verify that v satisfies the HJB equation (45), and then
apply El Karoui et al. (1997, Theorems 8.5, 8.6). Alternatively, a proof can
be constructed along the lines of Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, Ch. 6).
Next prove that v is the value function of the (nonclassical) optimal
stopping problem (9) (solving the HJB equation is not sufficient to imply
this). We consider only t = 0 and prove
v(0, z) = max
τ≥0
min
P∈P0
EP [X(Zτ )− cτ ].
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By Lemma 5.1,
v(0, z) = max
τ≥0
EP ∗ [X(Zτ )− cτ ] ≥ max
τ≥0
min
P∈P0
EP [X(Zτ )− cτ ].
To prove the opposite inequality, consider the stopping time
τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Zt ≤ f(t, r
l) or Zt ≥ f(t, r
R)}.
For t ≤ τ∗, by Ito’s formula, (45), and (47), dv(t, Zt) =
[vt(t, Zt) +
1
2
σ2vzz(t, Zt)]dt+ vz(t, Zt)dZt (48)
= [c− f(t, Zt)vz(t, Zt)]dt+ vz(t, Zt)dZt
= [c− f(t, Zt)vz(t, Zt)]dt+ vz(t, Zt)dZt.
Each P = P η ∈ P0 corresponds to a density generator process (ηt), and
(W ηt ) is a Brownian motion under P
η, where
W ηt =
1
σ
Zt +
1
σ
∫ t
0
f˜(s, Zs, ηs)ds, and
f˜(t, Zt, ηt) = [θ1 −
θ1 − θ0
1 + ηt1−ηtϕ(t, Zt)
].
Therefore, dv(t, Zt) =
[c+
(
f˜(t, Zt, ηt)− f(t, Zt)
)
vz(t, Zt)]dt+ σvz(t, Zt)dW
η
t .
Note that
(
f˜(t, Zt, ηt)− f(t, Zt)
)
vz(Zt) ≥ 0. (Suppose Zt < z˜t. Then
vz(Zt) ≤ 0 and f˜(t, Zt, ηt)−f(t, Zt) ≤ 0, the latter because [θ1−
θ1−θ0
1+ m
1−m
ϕ(t,z) ]
is increasing in m. Argue similarly for Zt < z˜t.) Take expectation above
under P η to obtain
v(0, z) ≤ EP η [v(τ
∗, Zτ∗)− cτ
∗]
= EP η [Xτ∗ − cτ
∗].
The above inequality is due to
EP η [
∫ τ∗
0
σvz(t, Zt)dW
η
t ] = 0,
which is guaranteed by
max
P∈P0
EP [τ
∗] <∞; (49)
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see Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, Theorem 21.1) for the classical case. In our
setting, (49) is implied by the boundedness of Xt because:
−∞ < max
τ≥0
min
P∈P0
EP (Xτ − cτ) = max
τ≥0
[−max
P∈P0
EP (cτ −Xτ )]
≤ max
τ≥0
[max
P∈P0
EP (Xτ )− max
P∈P0
EP (cτ)] =⇒ max
P∈P0
EP [τ
∗] <∞.
Finally, because P η can be any measure in P0, deduce that
v(0, z) ≤ min
P∈P0
EP [Xτ∗ − cτ
∗]
≤ max
τ≥0
min
P∈P0
EP [Xτ − cτ ].
Conclude that v is the value function for our optimal stopping problem and
that τ∗ is the optimal stopping time.
Remark 5.2 The preceding implies that P ∗ is indeed the minimizing mea-
sure because the minimax property is satisfied:
max
τ≥0
EP ∗X (Zτ ) = max
τ≥0
min
P∈P0
EPX (Zτ ) ≤
min
P∈P0
max
τ≥0
EPX (Zτ ) ≤ max
τ≥0
EP ∗X (Zτ ) =⇒
min
P∈P0
max
τ≥0
EPX (Zτ ) = max
τ≥0
min
P∈P0
EPX (Zτ ) .
Proof of (a.i): The proof is similar to that of (a.ii). The only difference is
that the value function v is given by v(t, z) =
(u00 − u01)(1−mt (z)) + u01 if z < f(t, r
l
2)
g3(mt (z) ;C5, C6) if f(t, r
l
2) ≤ z < f(t, r
l
1)
u2 if f(t, r
l
1) ≤ z < f(t, r
R
1 )
g4(mt (z) ;C7, C8) if f(t, r
R
1 ) ≤ z < f(t, r
R
2 )
(u11 − u10)mt (z) + u10 if f(t, r
R
2 ) ≤ z.
(50)
Here g3 and g4 are identical to g1 and g2 (defined in (43)) respectively, except
that the constants C1, ..., C4 are replaced respectively by C5, ..., C8 given by
C5 = −cˆℓ(r
l
1), C7 = −cˆℓ(r
R
1 )
C6 = u2 − cˆ[(2r
l
1 − 1) log(
rl1
1− rl1
)− ℓ(rl1)r
l
1]
C8 = u2 − cˆ[(2r
R
1 − 1) log(
rR1
1− rR1
)− ℓ(rR1 )r
R
1 ].
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Proof of (b): Since it is never optimal to choose a2, we can delete it from
the set of feasible actions. The proof proceeds as in (a.ii), though we define
v(t, z) = 
(u00 − u01)(1−mt (z)) + u01 if z < f(t, r˜
l)
g5(mt (z) ;C9, C10) if f(t, r˜
l) ≤ z < z˜t
g6(mt (z) ;C11, C12) if z˜t ≤ z < f(t, r˜
R)
(u11 − u10)mt (z) + u10 if f(t, r˜
R) ≤ z,
where g5 and g6 are identical to g1 and g2 (defined in (43)) respectively,
except that the constants C1, ..., C4 are replaced respectively by C9, ..., C12
given by
C9 = −cˆℓ(r˜
R) + u11 − u10
C11 = −cˆℓ(r˜
l) + u01 − u00
C10 = u10 − cˆ[1− l˜(r˜
R)]
C12 = u00 − cˆ[1− l˜(r˜
l)].
5.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Define lˆ(r) = (2r − 1) log( r1−r ). We prove the existence and uniqueness of
solutions to the following equations:
(32): Follows from l : (0, 1) → (−∞,∞) being surjective, continuous and
strictly increasing.
(33): Adapt the argument in Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, p. 290) used for
a classical optimal stopping problem, generalized here to our context with
ambiguity. For fixed rˆl ∈ (0, π), consider the following equation for V l(y):
V l(y) = cˆlˆ(y) + Cˆ1y + Cˆ2
V ly (y) = cˆl(y) + Cˆ1
V l(rˆl) = −(u00 − u01)rˆ
l + u00
V ly (rˆ
l) = u01 − u00,
(51)
where y ∈ (0, 1) and Cˆ1, Cˆ2 are constants to be determined. The solution is
V l(y) = cˆlˆ(y)− (u00 − u01 + cˆl(rˆ
l))y + u00 + cˆ(rˆ
ll(rˆl)− lˆ(rˆl)).
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Because V l(y) depends on rˆl, we denote the solution by V l(y; rˆl). If V l(π; rˆl) <
u00, then we consider the following equation for V
R(y):
V R(y) = cˆlˆ(y) + Cˆ3y + Cˆ4
V Ry (y) = cˆl(y) + Cˆ3
V R(π) = V l(π; rˆl)
V Ry (π) = V
l
y (π; rˆ
l),
(52)
where y ∈ [π, 1) and Cˆ3, Cˆ4 are constants to be determined. The solution is
V R(y) = cˆlˆ(y)+(V ly (π; rˆ
l)− cˆl(π))y+V l(π; rˆl)+ cˆ(πl(π)− lˆ(π))−πV ly (π; rˆ
l).
Denote the solution by V R(y; rˆl). Since lˆ′′(y) = l′(y) > 0 for y ∈ (0, 1), it is
easy to see that V l(y; rˆl) and V R(y; rˆl) are strictly convex functions. Recall
that π = mt(z˜t), π = mt(z˜t) and π(u11−u10)+u10 = (1− π) (u00−u01)+u01.
Then, V R(π) = V l(π; rˆl) implies that the function y 7−→ V R(y; rˆl) intersects
y 7−→ (u11−u10)y+u10 for some y ∈ (π, 1) when rˆ
l is close to π. Let y = yˆl
satify V l(y; rˆl) = u00. Then, yˆ
l ↓ 0 as rˆl ↓ 0.
Then, reducing rˆl from π down to 0 and applying the properties estab-
lished above, we obtain the existence of a unique point rˆl∗ ∈ (0, π) for which
there exists rˆR∗ ∈ (π, 1) such that
V R(rˆR∗ ; rˆ
l
∗) = (u11 − u10)rˆ
R
∗ + u10 (53)
V Ry (rˆ
R
∗ ; rˆ
l
∗) = u11 − u10.
Combining (51), (52) and (53), we can verify that (rˆR∗ , rˆ
l
∗) is a solution of
(33). Note that each step of the derivation is reversible. Thus, there exists
a unique solution (r˜R, r˜l) for (33). Inequalities (35) follow directly from
construction of the solution.
(31) and (30): By the definition of u∗∗2 and equation (32), it is easy to
check that u∗∗2 > u01. Set yˆ =
u00−u∗∗2
u00−u01
. Define the following payoff function
V (y) =
{
−(u00 − u01)y + u00 if y ∈ (0, yˆ);
u∗∗2 if y ∈ (yˆ, 1).
Then arguing as in Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, p. 290), we can prove that
there exists a unique solution (rl2, r
l
1) for (31). The proof for (30) is similar.
It is obvious that rl2 < r
l
1 and r
R
1 < r
R
2 due to l being strictly increasing.
Turn to the remainder of the lemma (we skip the most obvious as-
sertions). Given payoff symmetry, the definitions of π and π imply that
π + π = 1. Then rl + rR = 1 follows from (32) and l (r) + l (1− r) = 0.
30
Prove (37): Verify that 12 l (r) = l˜ (r)−
1
2r(1−r) + 1 and rewrite (30) as
l˜(rR2 )− l˜(r
R
1 ) =
1
2rR
2
(1−rR
2
)
− 1
2rR
1
(1−rR
1
)
+ u11−u10cˆ
l˜(rR2 )− l˜(r
R
1 ) =
u2−u10
cˆ .
If u2 = u
∗∗
2 , then, using payoff symmetry, we can verify that r
R
2 = r
R,
rR1 = π is the unique solution of (30). Next we prove that the solution
rR1 of (30) is increasing with respect to u2. Note that l
′(r) = 1
r2(1−r)2
and
l˜′(r) = 1
r(1−r)2
. From (30), derive
l′(rR2 )
drR2
drR1
− l′(rR1 ) = 0
l˜′(rR2 )
drR2
drR1
drR1
du2
− l˜(rR1 )
drR1
du2
=
1
cˆ
.
Thus,
drR1
du2
=
(rR1 )
2(1− rR1 )
2
cˆ(rR2 − r
R
1 )
> 0,
which proves rR1 ≥ π ⇐⇒ u2 ≥ u
∗∗
2 . Similarly, we can prove that r
l
1 ≤
π ⇐⇒ u2 ≥ u
∗∗
2 . 
5.3 Proofs for the applications
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (Ellsberg): (i) Compute that cˆ = cσ
2
2α2 , z˜t = 0,
π = 1−ǫ2 , π =
1+ǫ
2 . Equations (30) and (31) simplify to
rR2 + r
R
1 = 1, l(r
R
2 ) =
2α3
cσ2
rl2 + r
l
1 = 1, l(r
l
1) =
2α3
cσ2 ,
(which exploit the fact that u2 =
1
2(u00 + u10)), and the functions f and f
become
f(t, r) =
σ2
2α
log(
1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
r
1− r
)
f(t, r) =
σ2
2α
log(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
r
1− r
).
If rl1 <
1+ǫ
2 , then f(t, r
l
1) ≤ 0 ≤ f(t, r
R
1 ). By Theorem 4.2(a.i), the signal
Z0 = 0 falls in the stopping region which leads to τ
∗ = 0. This proves (i)
with r̂ = rl1.
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(ii) Equation (32) becomes
rR + rl = 1, l(rR) + l(
1 + ǫ
2
) = 4α
3
cσ2
,
and
z ≡ f(t, rR) = −f(t, rl) =
σ2
2α
[
log(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
) + log(
rR
1− rR
)
]
.
By Theorem 4.2(a.ii), τ∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : | Zt |≥ z}.
Let z be given by
z =
σ2
2α
log(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
) < z.
It follows from (16) and (11) that at any given t, not necessarily an optimal
stopping time, betting on the ambiguous urn is preferred to betting on the
risky urn iff | Zt |≥ z. Thus at τ
∗ > 0, | Zτ∗ |= z > z, and betting on the
ambiguous urn is optimal on stopping.
Finally, we show that z is increasing in ǫ: ℓ′ (r) = 1
r2(1−r)2
=⇒ dzdǫ > 0 iff
2rR
1−ǫ ℓ
′
(
rR
)
> 1+ǫ
1−rR
1
2ℓ
′
(
1+ǫ
2
)
iff 1+ǫ2 ·
1−ǫ
2 > r
R
(
1− rR
)
. But 12 <
1+ǫ
2 < r
l
1 <
rR =⇒
1+ǫ
2 ·
1−ǫ
2 > r
l
1
(
1− rl1
)
> rR
(
1− rR
)
. This completes proof of (ii) with
r = rR. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3 (hypothesis test): Given Theorem 4.2(b), it remains
only to prove (29) assuming that a = b. Payoff symmetry implies that (33)
reduces to (32). Using also Lemma 4.1, conclude that r˜l = 1− r˜R and that
r˜R solves l(r˜R) = l(π) + bcˆ <
b
cˆ . For Bayesians, π = π =
b
a+b , and (27)
implies that r˜lB = 1− r˜
R
B and l(r˜
R
B) =
a+b
2cˆ =
b
cˆ . Hence r˜
R < r˜RB . 
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